resources used to clear their land, since the mined areas were
fenced off and did not pose a threat to human life.19 According to
an article by the Falkland Islands News Network in 2008, however, it was wrongly reported previously that the inhabitants
were against demining because they didn’t want lots of strangers on the Islands while demining was being done; “[f]ew people would object to the positive [e]ffect on the economy if a large
number of people came to help with demining.”20 The United
Kingdom has requested a deadline extension of 10 years to clear
the Falkland/Malvinas Islands.18 At the Intersessional Standing
Committee Meetings in Geneva, Switzerland, on 4 June 2008, the
United Kingdom stated, “Let there be no doubt that the [United
Kingdom] takes all its obligations under the Ottawa Convention
extremely seriously.”21 The United Kingdom explained that undertaking demining operations in the Falklands could have negative environmental and socioeconomic consequences. 21
Denmark. Most of the landmines in Denmark have been
cleared, and only a small mined area remains in the marshes and
dunes of the peninsula of Skallingen, left behind from World
War II. Authorities in Denmark report that the remote area has
been fenced and no mine-related casualties have been recorded
since 1946. In its deadline-extension request, Denmark claims
that the delicate nature of the environment of Skallingen has
prevented it from moving forward with clearance operations.
Denmark states that clearance operations would risk “irreparable damage” to the environment without careful planning. 22
Venezuela. Although it became party to the Ottawa Convention in 1999, according to the Landmine Monitor, Venezuela is
still using AP mines and expects to miss its 2009 deadline. In
2007, Venezuela stated that it continues to employ AP mines to
protect its naval bases from Colombian insurgents. Only a small
amount of mine contamination remains, but Venezuela submitted a deadline extension request.23

States Parties in November 2008. Whether or not these countries were granted an extension, the 15 States Parties that have
applied still face serious mine problems. The humanitarian and
financial costs of the remaining landmines are great.
Not all States Parties with 2009 deadlines will fail to complete clearance on time. For instance, Bulgaria, Costa Rica,
France, Djibouti, FYR Macedonia, Guatemala, Honduras,
Malawi, Swaziland and Suriname have already fulfilled Article
5 clearance obligations.4, 11 Deadline extension request notwithstanding, the Ottawa Convention’s Implementation Support
Unit reports that two of the 16 remaining parties with obligations will most likely finish clearance within the specified time:
Niger and Uganda.11 The countries that have completed their
obligations demonstrate to the world that it is possible to become mine-free within the allotted 10-year period.
See Endnotes, page 112
This article was researched and written prior to 9MSP. The
Journal has freshened where possible the content prior to publishing. For more up-to-date information about Ottawa extensions,
see “The Article 5 Extension Request Process” by Tamar Gabelnick
on the following page.

Looking Ahead
The Ottawa Convention has certainly been a powerful force for
mine action in the international community. Since the entry into
force of the Convention, production of anti-personnel mines has
decreased and the trade of AP mines is almost non-existent. Millions of mines have been destroyed, and hundreds of square kilometers of land have been freed of landmine contamination. Indeed,
the Ottawa Convention has been called a “success in progress,”24
and 156 states have become parties to it, pledging to never use, produce, transfer, develop, retain or stockpile anti-personnel mines.25
The Convention has been successful, but it risks losing its efficacy because it appears that States Parties are not taking their obligations seriously enough, whether or not that may be the case.
Tamar Gabelnick of the ICBL believes that some countries need
to rethink their approach to their Article 5 obligations. “For some
countries, there needs to be a much greater effort on the part of
the national authorities to prioritize clearance and work more efficiently. Though the work is always challenging, where there is a will,
there is a way.” 4, 5 She recommends that those parties make more of
an effort to mobilize resources to get the work done as soon as possible. Other parties do not have accurate estimates of the contamination level. According to the ICBL, such parties should conduct
Technical and non-Technical Surveys first to determine the scope of
the problem. Countries will then be able to develop national mineaction strategies better after assessing the situation.5
It is not guaranteed that all States Parties that apply for extensions will receive them. The decision for each State Party that
requested an extension was made during the 9 th Meeting of the
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The Article 5 Extension
Request Process
The International Campaign to Ban Landmines was very specific in saying that there were to be no
exceptions to the 10-year deadline placed in the Ottawa Convention.1 However, with the Convention’s
first mine-clearance deadline quickly approaching in 2009, at least 15 countries have found they
may have bitten off more than they can chew. Or have they?
by Tamar Gabelnick
[ International Campaign to Ban Landmines ]

W

hen the Ottawa Convention was being negotiated in
States Parties should be given to clear mined areas, or indeed
1997, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines
whether there should be a deadline at all. 3 It was eventually reccalled for a text with “no exceptions, no reservations,
ognized that without the impetus of a legally binding deadline,
and no loopholes.” The result was a treaty that was remarkably
the clearance work could drag on indefinitely, which would not
simple and straightforward, including with regards to mine clearbe in keeping with the convention’s intent.
ance. Under Article 5, mine-affected States Parties have a clear
At the same time, states understood that in some cases—
duty to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas as soon
because of the sheer quantity of mined areas or other extraordias possible, but no later than 10 years after joining the treaty. The
nary circumstances—certain mine-affected states would need
link between the treaty’s humanitarian and
disarmament objectives is equally clear; the
sooner the mines are taken out of the ground
and destroyed, the sooner people can farm the
land, use grazing pastures, gather wood, walk
to markets and schools, and engage in countless other essential activities safely again. The
longer it takes to clear mined areas along borders or around security installations, the longer
a State Party may be continuing to make military or strategic use of the mines.
Despite the urgent need to remove emplaced mines for humanitarian and/or disarmament purposes, there is a possibility of
requesting one or more extensions to the 10year deadline. Mine-affected states that became parties to the Convention in 1999 face
their mine-clearance deadlines in 2009, and
those that do not expect to finish on time
were required to request an extension at the
9th Meeting of the States Parties in November
Deminers prepa ring for a “hand
over ceremony” in Yeme n.
2008. Fifteen countries, or about two-thirds of
ALL PHOTOS COURTESY OF THE
AUTHOR
the original group with 2009 deadlines, will
seek such an extension.2 The extension-request
process has therefore been one of the hot topics of 2008 as States
more than 10 years to clear their land. The original proposed
Parties and other interested actors grappled with how to handle
text, put forward by the ICRC, was that the extension should be
the requests in a way that would respect the intent of the treaty
“the minimum necessary, but in no case shall the extension exand set the best possible precedent for future requests.
ceed five years.”4 Ultimately, the text was changed to allow for up
to 10 additional years, which would be renewable. States Parties
The History of the Extension-request Process
requesting more time would have to provide a detailed rationale
The extension-request story does not begin with the 2008
for the extension, and other States Parties must assess and vote
meeting, however, but rather in 1997, when the Ottawa Conon the request. The understanding remained, however, that such
vention was drafted. During the negotiations, states, the ICBL,
extensions should be the exception, not the rule.
the International Committee of the Red Cross and other parThe extension issue was then put aside for many years while
ticipants discussed at length the question of how many years
States Parties focused on how to complete mine-clearance
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obligations as efficiently and safely as possible. It resurfaced
in preparation for the 7th Meeting of States Parties, which took
place 18–22 September 2006 in Geneva, when States Parties
developed mechanisms both to guide the requesting states in
the preparation of the requests and to assist the other States
Parties to analyze the requests. The ICBL and the ICRC, in
particular, encouraged the development of such mechanisms in
order to ensure that States Parties
took seriously both the duty to
diligently prepare requests and to
thoroughly assess and make an informed decision on them. 5 Without such safeguards in place, the
concern was that granting an extension would be only a formality,
which could seriously undermine
respect for the initial deadline.
Easy extension approvals could
also encourage some states to postpone mine clearance indefinitely since a state could seemingly ask for more than one extension without repercussions.
At the 7MSP, States Parties developed a voluntary template
to help the requesting states satisfy the treaty requirements
while providing sufficient information for other States Parties
to review the requests thoroughly and vote on the outcome. 6
It was hoped that the template would serve another important goal, namely to encourage requesting states to take careful stock of what had they had achieved to date, what remained
to be done, and how they planned to finish their obligations as
quickly as possible.
States Parties also agreed at the 7MSP to assign responsibility to a small group of states to carry out an initial analysis
of the requests. Not all states would have the time or capacity to conduct a thorough review of what would involve lengthy
and technical requests. This idea turned out to be especially prescient in a year with 15 requests, several over 100 pages long. It
was also noted that this group—comprised of the co-chairs and
co-rapporteurs of the Convention’s Standing Committees plus
the President of the MSP—should be able to call on outside expertise to help them with the technical, legal or diplomatic elements of the requests. This formulation was a compromise on
the original idea put forward by the ICBL and others for a group
of experts to assess the requests.
The treaty’s Implementation Support Unit was instructed to
assist states to develop their requests with the overarching goal
of eliciting “realistic, but not unambitious” requests.7 States were
also instructed to provide a draft request nine months ahead of
the MSP or Review Conference where it would be considered
in order to give those states doing the initial analysis enough
time to do so.
In summary, the extension-request process was developed
to complement simple treaty language with additional informal mechanisms with a view to promote effective treaty implementation. The importance of this particular mechanism
cannot be understated—without the means to ensure the thorough preparation and evaluation of the requests, any state
seeking to avoid its Article 5 obligations by delaying them indefinitely could do so without hindrance. As Croatia stated at
the 7MSP, the extension provision should serve as “a vehicle for
the full implementation of the Convention and not a means for
getting around it.”8

The Current State of Play
Again, the decisions of the 7MSP have proven significant
given what has transpired over the past two years. It seems that
several States Parties were indeed interested in using the Convention’s extension provision to prolong clearance for many
years or even to postpone it indefinitely. As the ICBL said at the

…the extension request process was developed to complement simple treaty
language with additional informal mechanisms with a view to promote effective
treaty implementation.
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Intersessional Standing Committee meetings in June 2008, if the
international community’s intention—as reflected in the Nairobi
Action Plan—was for “few, if any states” to ask for an extension,
then we have collectively and by a disappointing margin failed to
meet our goal. As noted above, at the 9th Meeting of States Parties 15 states submitted requests for an extension, 10 of them for
periods of five years or longer.
There are certainly some States Parties requesting extensions, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Thailand, that
had very large suspected hazardous areas and were generally expected to need more time to demine them. Others, like Denmark,
Jordan, Mozambique and Nicaragua, should have been able to
complete their obligations on time, but delays in commencing
effective planning and clearance and/or management issues
(among other reasons) forced them to ask for additional time.
Technical difficulties—such as demining areas with deep, shifting sands in Yemen—have been a factor in many other requests,
and funding shortfalls were cited by most states as an important
reason for needing more time. Countries like Senegal and Chad
have also been hampered by ongoing hostilities, though in the
case of Senegal additional administrative delays have prevented
earlier clearance of areas local experts already deem were safe
to clear.
The most troubling aspect about the set of extension requests
in 2008 is not just the number of states seeking a request, but
also the number of those—including Ecuador, Peru, the United
Kingdom and Venezuela—that should not have needed to make
a request and certainly not for the length of time requested. Each
offers its own set of special circumstances to support its request,
but none justifies the length of time requested. Ecuador and Peru,
each with less than 500,000 square meters (123 acres) remaining
to clear, cite difficult climatic, geographic and logistical issues
in demining their mountainous border as reasons for requesting
eight more years.9 But Ecuador plans to increase significantly its
number of deminers and may be able to sharply reduce its estimate of suspected hazardous areas through Technical Survey. Its
request does not reflect these developments and in any case, it
simply lacks ambition.
Peru cleared 300,000 square meters (74 acres) in the border area in 1999–2000, making one wonder why they need an
additional eight years to clear the 192,000 square meters (47
acres) remaining in that region. Peru plans to clear the remaining 335,000 square meters (83 acres) of contaminated

land in the interior of the country by 2010. Once its police
forces finish demining the other sites in 2010, Peru will have a
large force of trained deminers capable of helping in the border region.
The United Kingdom, with responsibility for clearing the
Falkland/Malvinas Islands,10 cites the sovereignty dispute with
Argentina and the difficult geographical conditions as reasons
that it has not yet cleared any mined areas. But the additional reasons for delays, which the United Kingdom openly expresses, are the supposed reluctance on the part of the islanders
to remove the mines and the high cost involved in bringing in
and supporting demining personnel in such an isolated spot.
In other words, the United Kingdom has demonstrated why it
is unmotivated to begin operations, which is also reflected in
its failure to provide a starting date for operations, a detailed

Communities have lived too long with the menace of mines. Photo

taken in Bosnia.

timeframe, or a budget allocated to its 10-year request, essential components of an extension request that all the other states
have managed to provide.
Finally, Venezuela is seeking an additional five years to clear
13 small, mined areas around six of its naval bases. None of the
reasons it cites for the delay—difficult terrain, annual flooding, problems with access and the need to provide security to
deminers from Colombian guerrillas across the river—should
have prevented Venezuela from completing the demining process long ago. The problem is small, contained and not technically challenging outside of the flooding season. What has
prevented Venezuela from completing its Article 5 obligations,
to its own admission in past years, is that Venezuela has been
relying on the minefields to protect the naval bases from crossborder attacks and wanted to wait for an alternative defense system to be installed before taking the mines out of the ground. In
other words, Venezuela has been gaining active military benefit
from the mined areas, which is clearly a violation of Article 1’s
ban on the use of landmines.
With perhaps the exception of those states experiencing
ongoing conflict or having an extremely large initial estimate
of contaminated areas, the reasons mentioned above are not

the extraordinary circumstances originally envisaged when
the extension provision was created. But one could consider
that the first set of states with obligations under the Ottawa Convention had more of a learning curve than those that joined
later, as demining methods, structures and technologies have
developed significantly over the past many years. At the very
least, several of these states have used the process to undertake careful reflection of past and anticipated activities and
have developed plans that are well-thought-through and reasonably ambitious.
Analyzing the Requests
Since February 2008, the group of states named in the 7MSP
decision—sometimes referred to as the “Analyzing Group”—has
been spending many hours studying and discussing the long,
detailed requests. They have sought
expert input from the ICBL, ICRC,
the Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining, the United
Nations Development Programme and
other organizations, albeit on a surprisingly limited basis given the lack
of technical and country-specific expertise of the diplomats assessing the
requests. Members met with most requesting states at the Intersessional
Standing Committee meetings in June
2008 to discuss the requests in detail.
They asked many countries for additional information or clarification and
sent a few back to the drawing board
for more work. They have even strongly encouraged a small number of states
to revisit the period of time requested.
Also at the June 2008 ISC meetings, a few Latin American states
stressed the importance of examining
each country’s extension request on
its own merits and in relation only to
the specific conditions in that country.
While a comparative approach might bring to light the relative
effort made by one state next to another, even taken in isolation,
it is hard to understand how some states plan to take so much
time to achieve so little.
Nor is it fair to those states that have done the most work to
put so little pressure on other states to be equally efficient. A distinction must be made between those countries that have diligently tried to implement their Article 5 obligations and those
that have put in a fraction of the resources or achieved a fraction of the results over the same time period. There is clearly a
continuum between the best and worst cases, and the Analyzing Group has engaged with most of the countries in order to
encourage better planning and greater efficiency. But if States
Parties treat all cases with kid gloves, what would be the political “carrot” for those that have led the way in mine action?
And more importantly, what would be the “stick” for those that
have flagrantly disregarded the Convention’s obligation to act as
quickly as possible?
What was to be decided at the 9MSP this year was therefore crucial for the integrity of Article 5. Not only would these
decisions show how States Parties would treat cases of virtual
non-compliance with Article 5.1, but they would also send a
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signal to states with deadlines in the coming years on how their
own cases will be handled. The precedent set at the 9MSP would
either discourage states from presenting unjustified extension
requests or it would let them know that “anything goes.”
The views put forward by the Analyzing Group were critically important because they provided the basis on which other
states took their decisions at the 9MSP. Despite the importance
of their role, a small number of states in the Analyzing Group
encouraged a passive and uncritical role for the group, reportedly politicizing and personalizing the workings of the group.
They also fought hard to keep the group’s work closed and secretive, which is highly unusual for the work of the Ottawa
Convention, born out of a close collaboration between states
and nongovernmental partners. Despite these constraints, the
group managed to produce several final analyses with useful
constructive criticism. But the analyses clearly applied different
standards to different states, showing the regional bias of some
Analyzing Group members. Perhaps the most positive outcome
of the group’s work was the proactive engagement with the requesting states that in some cases led to new requests reflecting
improved planning.
The 9MSP and the End Game
After the analyses were given to the other States Parties, it
was their turn to reflect on and guide the outcome at the 9MSP.
The treaty says that the MSP, or Review Conference, shall “assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States
Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for
an extension period.”1 The question was therefore how states
would react to those requests that did not merit approval as
presented. As noted above, the first action was for the Analyzing Group to try to get certain countries to amend the requests,
including the amount of time requested. This approach was the
most logical and diplomatic way of dealing with the problem,
and it worked in a few cases. States did, of course, have the option to turn down the request, but that would mean that the
country would be in violation of the treaty when its deadline
passes, and therefore, States Parties were reluctant to consider
this possibility.
The solution proposed by the President of the 9MSP, Ambassador Jurg Streuli of Switzerland, was for states to grant all
requests as drafted, but with comments from States Parties that
in certain cases encouraged the country to complete the demining work faster than planned and/or to clarify other outstanding issues of concern in the requests.
This approach was satisfactory for most cases, but the ICBL
was still calling for States Parties to turn down requests from
any state that had no plans to begin demining operations before
its original 10-year deadline, namely the United Kingdom and
Venezuela. States Parties chose to focus their criticism on the
United Kingdom, which, unlike Venezuela, presented a request
for the maximum 10 years with no timeline or budget for beginning, let alone finishing, its demining duties. In essence, they
were asking for carte blanche to implement Article 5 if and when
it liked. States Parties understood that such a request would be
highly detrimental to the treaty and therefore spoke out publicly
and privately against it. The United Kingdom tried to calm its
critics by announcing that it would launch a tender in 2009 to
begin demining three of its 117 mined areas and by arguing that
a feasibility study with a range of vague demining options actually constituted a concrete plan.
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In the end, States Parties’ dissatisfaction with these small
steps coupled with their continued concern about the implications of a “no” vote for the treaty led to a compromise outcome. The United Kingdom’s request, along with the other 14
requesting parties, was approved without a vote, and each was
accompanied by comments in the form of an MSP decision. In
the United Kingdom’s language, it agreed to return to States
Parties within 1.5 years with more details about its work plan,
to provide regular progress reports, and to consider on an annual basis if it would be possible to reduce the time necessary
to finish its demining duties. States Parties also encouraged
the United Kingdom—along with Ecuador, Peru and Senegal—
to finish demining more quickly than initially planned. The
decision for Venezuela was the weakest, commenting simply
that it “may find itself in a situation wherein it could complete
implementation before October 2014 and that this could benefit the Convention.” Other useful comments in the analyses
did not make it into the final decisions because the concerned
states were given the chance to approve the decision language.
Conclusion
Despite some shortcomings, the first extension request
decision process produced a solid foundation on which the
future implementation of Article 5 can rest. States Parties that
asked for more time to demine were challenged to show that
they were truly seeking the minimum time necessary to complete the work. The process could still use improvement—to
prevent regional discrepancies in the treatment of requests
for example—but overall States Parties confirmed that there
will be no rubber-stamping of requests and made it clear that
the duty to demine “as soon as possible” also applies to the
extension period.
See Endnotes, page 112
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The Case of Mozambique
With the impending 2009 Ottawa Convention1 deadline quickly approaching, it has become clear
that Mozambique will not be able to complete their required obligations without an extension.
Dwindling funding, inadequate resources and the challenge of other internal problems have
delayed the mine-action progress, but what will be the solution?
by Maria Isabel Macedo dos Santos [ Instituto Nacional de Desminagem Mozambique ]
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A

decade has passed since the signing of the Ottawa Convention and the commitment of the States Parties to
work toward eradicating landmines in all affected countries. In this period, significant progress on landmine clearance
and victim assistance has been registered, and significant areas
have been cleared and released to the communities.
The Progress
Mozambique signed and ratified the Ottawa Convention, becoming a State Party in March 1999. In May 1999, Mozambique
hosted the First Meeting of States Parties in its capital, Maputo.
In compliance with Ottawa Convention Article 4, Mozambique
destroyed its anti-personnel landmine stockpiles in February
2003 and has been conducting clearance activities to meet the
March 2009 deadline.
Like many affected countries, Mozambique has endured war
and destabilization for more than 30 years, leaving landmines
and unexploded ordnance spread all over the country. In 1992
when the government and the then-rebel movement Resistência

Nacional de Moçambique (RENAMO) signed a peace agreement
in Rome, the United Nations dispatched its peacekeeping mission, and one of its mandates included demining operations.
Mozambique has been demining its countryside since then.
The Problem
Mozambique faces many other challenges, including poverty,
natural disasters and endemic diseases such as HIV/AIDS. The
majority of its population is rural and, consequently, the presence of landmines and other UXO constitutes a major impediment to the economic and social development of affected areas.
Fifteen years of demining activities have elapsed, surveys
have been conducted and thousands of square meters of land
have been released to the people. A recent baseline assessment,
carried out by The HALO Trust in the remaining affected areas,
has shown that there is work to be done to comply with Article
52 of the Ottawa Convention. The 2009 Convention deadline is
approaching, and the landmine problem is far from solved. Out
of the 36 States Parties with deadlines for 2009 and 2010, only 10
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